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Abstract. We introduce a novel technique for finding real errors in pro-
grams. The technique is based on a synergy of three well-known meth-
ods: metacompilation, slicing, and symbolic execution. More precisely,
we instrument a given program with a code that tracks runs of state
machines representing various kinds of errors. Next we slice the program
to reduce its size without affecting runs of state machines. And then
we symbolically execute the sliced program. Depending on the kind of
symbolic execution, the technique can be applied as a stand-alone bug
finding technique, or to weed out some false positives from an output
of another bug-finding tool. We provide several examples demonstrating
the practical applicability of our technique.
1 Introduction
The title of this paper refers to two popular bug-finding techniques: metacom-
pilation and symbolic execution. The two techniques use completely different
principles leading to different advantages and disadvantages.
Metacompilation [10,26] is a static analysis technique looking for various
kinds of errors specified by state machines. We explain the technique with use
of the state machine SM(x) of Figure 1, which describes errors in lock manip-
ulation. Intuitively, the state machine represents possible courses of states of
a lock referenced by x along an execution of a program. The state of the lock
is changed according to a transition of the state machine if the execution per-
forms a program statement syntactically subsuming the label of the transition.
We would like to decide whether there exists any program execution where an
instance of state machine SM(x) assigned to some lock of the analyzed program
reaches an error state. Unfortunately, this is not feasible due to potentially un-
bounded number of executions and unbounded execution length. Hence, we use
static analysis to overapproximate the set of reachable states of state machines.
Let us assume that we want to check the program of Figure 2 for errors
specified by the state machine SM(x). First, we find all locks in the program
and to each lock we assign an instance of the state machine. In our case, there is
only one lock pointed by L and thus only one instance SM(L). For each program
location, we compute a set overapproximating possible states of SM(L) after
executions leading to the location. Roughly speaking, we initialize the set in the
U L
lock(x)
unlock(x)
DU
unlock(x)
DL
lock(x)
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return
Fig. 1. State machine SM(x) describing errors in manipulation with lock x. The nodes
U and L refer to states unlocked and locked, respectively. The other three nodes refer
to error states: DU to double unlock, DL to double lock, and RL to return in locked
state. The initial node is U.
initial location to {U} and the other sets to ∅. Then we repeatedly update the
sets according to the effect of individual program statements until the fixed point
is reached. The resulting sets for the program of Figure 2 are written directly in
the code listing as comments.
As we can see, the sets contain two error states: double unlock after the
unlock(L) statement and return in locked state in the terminal location. If we
analyze the computation of the sets, we can see that the first error corresponds
to executions going through lines 1,2,3,4,8, then iterating the while-loop and
finally passing lines 13,14. These execution paths are not feasible due to the
value of len, which is set to 0 at line 3 and assumed to satisfy len > 0 at line
13. Hence, the first error is a false positive. The second error corresponds to
1: har *copy (har *dst , har *src , int n, int *L) {
2: int i, len; // {U}
3: len = 0; // {U}
4: if (src != NULL && dst != NULL ) { // {U}
5: len = n; // {U}
6: lock (L); // {L}
7: } // {U,L}
8: i = 0; // {U,L}
9: while (i < len) { // {U,L}
10: dst[i] = src[i]; // {U,L}
11: i++; // {U,L}
12: } // {U,L}
13: if (len > 0) { // {U,L}
14: unlock(L); // {DU ,U}
15: } // {U,L}
16: return dst; // {U,RL}
17: }
Fig. 2. Function copy copying a source string src into a buffer dst using a lock L to
prevent parallel writes.
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executions passing lines 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8, then iterating the while-loop and finally
going through lines 13,16. All these paths are also infeasible except the one
that performs zero iterations of the while-loop, which is the only real execution
leading to the only real locking error in the program.
To sum up, metacompilation is highly flexible, fast, and thus applicable on
extremely large software projects (e.g. the Linux kernel). It examines all the
code and finds many error reports. Unfortunately, some of the reports are false
positives. The main source of false positives is related to the fact that the anal-
ysis does not work with data values. In particular, the analysis does not track
connections between variable values and states of state machines. A drawback of
this approach may be illustrated by the double unlock false positive detected in
the program of Figure 2 because the analysis does not know that the condition
at line 13 holds only if the state machine SM(L) is in state L.
At this point, we would like to emphasize that metacompilation actually
uses a more sophisticated algorithm enriched with many techniques for partial
elimination of false positives (see [26] for details). Metacompilation employs a
dedicated language for description of state machines called Metal. The idea
of error specification using state machines appears in several tools including
the original implementation of metacompilation called xgcc [26], Esp [11] or
Stanse [29].
In contrast to metacompilation, symbolic execution [27] analyzes each exe-
cution path separately. In contrast to standard execution, symbolic execution
replaces input data by symbols representing arbitrary values. Executed state-
ments then manipulate expressions over the symbols rather than exact values.
For each execution path, symbolic execution builds a formula called path con-
dition, which is a necessary and sufficient condition on input data to drive the
execution along the path. Whenever a path condition becomes unsatifiable, the
symbolic execution of this path is aborted as the path is unfeasible. The main
advantage of symbolic execution is that it works only with feasible executions
(assuming that we can decide satisfiability of a path condition) and hence it does
not report any false positives. A minor disadvantage is that implementations of
this technique usually detect only low-level errors leading to crash. To detect
a specific kind of error, the program has to be modified to reduce the error to
a detected one (typically violation of an assert statement). The main disad-
vantage of the technique is its high compuation cost. In particular, programs
containing loops or recursion have typically large or even infinite number of exe-
cution paths and cannot be completely analyzed by symbolic execution. Hence,
symbolic execution usually explores only a part of an analyzed program.
In this paper, we introduce a new technique offering a flexibility of metacom-
pilation and zero false positive rate of symbolic execution. The basic idea is very
simple: we use the concept of state machines to get flexibility in error specifica-
tion. Then we instrument a given program with a code for tracking behaviors of
the state machines. The instrumented program is then reduced using the slic-
ing method introduced in [38]. The sliced program has to meet the criterion to
be equivalent to the instrumented program with respect to reachability of error
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states of tracked state machines. Note that slicing may remove big portions of
the code, including loops and function calls. Hence, an original program with an
infinite number of execution paths may be reduced to a program with a finite
number of execution paths. Finally, we execute the sliced program symbolically.
Our technique may be used in two ways according to the applied symbolic
execution tool. If we apply a symbolic executor that prefers to explore more
parts of the code (for example, it can explore only the execution paths iterating
each program loop at most twice), we may use the technique as a general bug-
finding technique reporting only real errors. Note that this approach may miss
errors appearing only on unexplored paths. On the contrary, if we use a sym-
bolic executor exploring all execution paths, we may use our technique for basic
classification of error reports produced by other tools (e.g. xgcc or Stanse).
For each such an error report, we may instrument the corresponding code only
with the state machine describing that reported error. If our technique finds the
same error, it is a real one. If our technique explores all execution paths of the
sliced code without detecting the error, it is a false positive. If our technique
runs out of resources, we cannot decide whether the error is a real one or just a
false positive.
We have developed an experimental tool implementing our technique. The
tool instruments a program with a state machine describing locking errors (we
use a single-purpose instrumentation so far), then it applies an interprocedural
slicing to the instrumented code, and it passes the sliced code to symbolic execu-
tor Klee [7]. Our experimental results indicate that the technique can indeed
classify error reports produced by Stanse applied to the Linux kernel.
We emphasize the synergy of the three known methods combined in the
presented technique.
– The errors are specified by state machines (inspired by metacompilation)
and a given program instrumented with a code emulating the state ma-
chines. This provides us simple slicing criteria: we want to preserve values
of memory places representing states of state machines. Hence, the sliced
program contains only the code relevant to the considered errors.
– Slicing may substantially reduce the size of the code, which in turn may
remarkably improve performance of the symbolic execution.
– Application of symbolic execution brings us another benefit. While in meta-
compilation, the state machines are associated to syntactic objects (e.g. lock
variables appearing in a program), we may associate state machines to actual
values of these objects. This leads to a higher precision of error detection,
which may potentially result in a detection of real errors missed by meta-
compilation.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2, 3, and 4 deal with
program instrumentation, slicing, and symbolic execution, respectively. Experi-
mental implementation of our technique and some experimental results are dis-
cussed in Section 5. Section 6 is devoted to related work while Section 7 indicates
some directions driving our future research. Finally, the last section summarizes
presented results.
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2 Instrumentation
The purpose of the instrumentation phase of our algorithm is to insert a code
implementing a state machine into the analysed program. Nevertheless, the se-
mantics of the program being instrumented must not be changed. A result of this
phase is therefore a new program that still has the original functionality and it
simultaneously updates instrumented state machines. We show the process using
the state machine SM(x) of Figure 1 and the program consisting of a function
foo of 3 and the function copy of Figure 2. The function foo calls the function
copy twice, first with the lock L1 and then with the lock L2. The locks guard
writes into buffers buf1 and buf2 respectively. The function foo is a so-called
starting function. It is a function where the symbolic execution starts.
har *buf1 , *buf2 ;
int L1 , L2;
void foo(har *src , int n) {
copy (src , buf1 , n, &L1);
copy (src , buf2 , n, &L2);
}
Fig. 3. Function foo forms the analysed program together with function copy.
The instrumentation starts by recognizing the code fragments in the analysed
program which manipulate with locks. More precisely, we look for all those code
fragments matching edge labels of the state machine SM(x) of Figure 1. The
analysed program contains three such fragments, all of them in function copy
(see Figure 2): the call to lock at line 6, the call to unlock at line 14, and the
return statement at line 16.
Next we determine a set of all locks that are manipulated by the program.
From the recognized code fragments, we find out that a pointer variable L in
copy is the only program variable through which the program manipulates with
locks. Using a points-to analysis, we obtain obtain the set {L1, L2} of all possible
locks the program manipulates with.
We introduce a unique instance of the state machine SM(x) for each lock in
the set. More precisely, we define two integer variables smL1 and smL2 for keep-
ing current state of state machines SM(L1) and SM(L2), respectively. Further,
we need to specify a mapping from locks to their state machines. The mapping
is basically a function (preferably with constant complexity) from addresses of
program objects (i.e. the locks) to addresses of related state machines. Figure 4
shows an implementation of a function smGetMachine that maps addresses of
locks L1 and L2 to addresses of related state machines. We note that the imple-
mentation of smGetMachine would be more complicated if state machines are
associated to dynamically allocated objects.
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1: onst int smU = 0; // state U
2: onst int smL = 1; // state L
3: onst int smDU = 2; // state DU
4: onst int smDL = 3; // state DL
5: onst int smRL = 4; // state RL
6:
7: onst int smLOCK = 0; // transition lock (x)
8: onst int smUNLOCK = 1; // transition unlock(x)
9: onst int smRETURN = 2; // transition return
10:
11: int smL1 = smU , smL2 = smU;
12:
13: int * smGetMachine (int *p) {
14: if (p == &L1) return &smL1 ;
15: if (p == &L2) return &smL2 ;
16: return NULL ; // unreachable
17: }
18:
19: void smFire(int *SM , int transition ) {
20: swith (*SM) {
21: ase smU:
22: swith (transition ) {
23: ase smLOCK:
24: *SM = smL;
25: break;
26: ase smUNLOCK :
27: assert(false); // double unlock
28: break;
29: default: break;
30: }
31: break;
32: ase smL:
33: swith (transition ) {
34: ase smLOCK:
35: assert(false); // double lock
36: break;
37: ase smUNLOCK :
38: *SM = smU;
39: break;
40: ase smRETURN :
41: assert(false); // return in locked
42: break;
43: default: break;
44: }
45: break;
46: default : break;
47: }
48: }
Fig. 4. Implementation of the state machine (smFire) and its identification
(smGetMachine).
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Figure 4 contains also many constants and a function smFire implement-
ing the state machine SM(x). Further, Figure 4 declares variables smL1 and
smL2 and initialize them to the initial state of the state machine. Note that we
represent both states of the machine and names of transitions by integer con-
stants. Also note that the pointer argument SM of smFire function points to an
instrumented state machine, whose transition has to be fired.
It remains to instrument the recognized code fragments in the original pro-
gram. For each fragment we know its related transition of the state machine and
we also know what objects the fragment manipulates with (if any). Therefore, we
first retrieve an address of state machine related to manipulated objects (if any)
by using the function smGetMachine and then we fire the transition by calling
the function smFire. The instrumented version of the original program consists
of the code of Figure 4 and the instrumented version of the original functions
foo and copy given in Figure 5, where the instrumented lines are highlighted
by *.
har *buf1 , *buf2 ;
int L1 , L2;
har *copy (har *dst , har *src , int n, int *L) {
int i, len;
len = 0;
if (src != NULL && dst != NULL ) {
len = n;
* smFire(smGetMachine (L), smLOCK );
lock (L);
}
i = 0;
while (i < len) {
dst[i] = src[i];
i++;
}
if (len > 0) {
* smFire(smGetMachine (L), smUNLOCK );
unlock(L);
}
* smFire( smGetMachine (L), smRETURN );
return dst;
}
void foo(har *src , int n) {
copy (src , buf1 , n, &L1);
copy (src , buf2 , n, &L2);
}
Fig. 5. Functions foo and copy instrumented by calls of smFire function.
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3 Slicing
Let us have a look at the instrumented program in Figure 5. We can easily
observe, that the main part of the function copy, i.e. the loop copying the char-
acters, does not affect states of the instrumented state machines. Symbolic execu-
tion of such a code is very expensive. Therefore, we use the slicing technique [38]
to eliminate such a code from the instrumented program.
The input of the slicing algorithm is a program to be sliced and a so-called
slicing criteria. A slicing criterion is a pair of a program location and a set
of program variables. The slicing algorithm removes program statements that
do not affect any slicing criterion. More precisely, for each input data passed
to both original and sliced programs, values of the variable set of each slicing
criterion at the corresponding location are always equal in both programs. Our
analysis is interested only in states of the instrumented automata, especially
in locations corresponding to errors. Hence, the slicing criterion is a pair of a
location preceding an assert statement in smFire function and the set of all
variables representing current states of the corresponding state machines. The
slicing criteria then consists of all such pairs.
1: har *buf1 , *buf2 ;
2: int L1 , L2;
3:
4: har *copy(har *dst , har *src , int n, int *L) {
5: int len;
6: len = 0;
7: if (src != NULL && dst != NULL ) {
8: len = n;
9: smFire(smGetMachine (L), smLOCK );
10: }
11: if (len > 0) {
12: smFire(smGetMachine (L), smUNLOCK );
13: }
14: smFire( smGetMachine (L), smRETURN );
15: return dst;
16: }
17:
18: void foo(har *src , int n) {
19: copy (src , buf1 , n, &L1);
20: copy (src , buf2 , n, &L2);
21: }
Fig. 6. Functions foo and copy after slicing.
In the instrumented program of Figures 4 and 5, we want to preserve variables
smL1 and smL2. We put slicing criteria into the lines of code detecting transitions
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of state machines into error states. In other words, the slicing criteria for our run-
ning example are pairs (27,{smL1,smL2}), (35,{smL1,smL2}), (41,{smL1,smL2}),
where the number refers to lines in the code of Figure 4. The result of the slic-
ing procedure is presented in Figures 4 and 6 (the code in the former figure
shall not changed by the slicing). Note that the sliced code contains neither the
while-loop nor the lock and unlock commands.
It is important to note that some slicing techniques, including the one in [38]
that we use, do not consider inputs for which the original program does not halt.
Therefore, there is no way to guarantee that a sliced program will fail to halt
whenever the original program fails to halt. This is the only principal source of
potential false positives in our technique.
4 Symbolic Execution
This is the final phase of our technique. We symbolically execute the sliced
program from the entry location of the starting function. Symbolic execution
explores real program paths. Therefore, if it reaches some of the assertions inside
function smFire, then we have found a bug.
Our running example nicely illustrates the crucial role of slicing to feasibility
of symbolic execution. Let us first consider symbolic execution of the original
program. It starts at the entry location of the function foo. The execution even-
tually reaches the function copy. Note that value of the parameter n is symbolic.
Therefore, symbolic execution will fork into two executions each time we reach
line 9 of Figure 2. One of the executions skips the loop at lines 9–12, while the
other enters it. If we assume that the type of n is a 32 bit integer, then the
symbolic execution of one call of copy explores more then 231 real paths.
By contrast, the sliced program does not contain the loop, which generated
the huge number of real paths. Therefore, a number of real paths explored by
the symbolic execution is exactly 6. Figure 7 shows the symbolic execution tree
of the sliced program of Figure 6. We left out vertices corresponding to lines in
called functions smGetMachine and smFire. Note that although the parameter
n has a symbolic value, it can only affect the branching at line 11. Moreover,
the parameter L always has a concrete value. Therefore, we do not fork symbolic
execution at branchings inside functions smGetMachine and smFire. Three of
the explored paths are marked with the label bug. These paths reach the sec-
ond assertion in function smFire (see Figure 4) called from line 14 of the sliced
program. In other words, the paths are witnesses that we can leave the function
copy in a locked state. The remaining explored paths of Figure 7 miss the asser-
tions in the function smFire. It means that the original program contains only
one locking error, namely return in locked state.
5 Implementation and Experimental Results
To verify applicability of the presented technique, we have developed an exper-
imental implementation. Our experimental tool works with programs in C and,
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Fig. 7. Symbolic execution tree of the sliced program of Figure 6.
for the sake of simplicity, it detects only locking errors described by a state ma-
chine very similar to SM(x) of Figure 1. The instances of the state machine
are associated with arguments of lock and unlock function calls. Note that the
technique currently works only for the cases where a lock is instantiated only
once during the run of the symbolic executor. It works on a vast majority of the
code we used. However we plan to add a support even for the rest. The main part
of our implementation is written in three modules for the Llvm framework [41],
namely Prepare, Slicer, and Kleerer. The framework provides us with the
C compiler clang. We also use an existing symbolic executor for Llvm called
Klee [7].
Instrumentation of a given program proceeds in two steps. Using a C prepro-
cessor, the original program is instrumented with function calls smFire located
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just above statements changing states of state machines. The program is then
translated by clang into Llvm bytecode [41]. Optimizations are turned off as
required by Klee. The rest of the instrumentation (e.g. adding global variables
and changing the code to work with them) is done on the Llvm code using the
module Prepare.
The module Slicer implements a variant of the inter-procedural slicing al-
gorithm by Weiser [38]. To guarantee correctness and to improve performance
of slicing, the algorithm employs points-to analysis by Andersen [2].
The module Kleerer performs a final processing of the sliced bytecode before
it is passed to Klee. In particular, the module adds to the bytecode a function
main that calls a starting function. The main function also allocates a symbolic
memory for each parameter of the starting function. Size of the allocated memory
is determined by the parameter type. Plus, when the parameter is a pointer, the
size is multiplied by 4000. For example, 4 bytes are allocated for an integer
and 16000 bytes for an integer pointer. Further, for the pointer case, we pass
a pointer to the middle of the allocated memory (functions might dereference
memory at negative index). The idea behind is explained in [31]. Finally, the
resulting bytecode is symbolically executed by Klee. If a symbolic execution
touches a memory out of the allocated area, we get a memory error. To remedy
this inconvenience, we plan to implement the same on-demand memory handling
UcKlee [31] does.
5.1 Experiments
We have performed our experiments on several functions of the Linux kernel
2.6.28, where the static analyzer Stanse reported some error. More precisely,
Stanse reported an error trace starting in these functions. We consulted the
errors with kernel developers to sort out which are false positives and which are
real errors. All the selected functions (and all functions transitively called from
them) contain no assembler (in some cases, it has been replaced by an equivalent
C code) and no external function calls after slicing.
We ran our experimental tool on these functions. All tests were performed
on a machine with an Intel E6850 dual-core processor at 3GHz and 6GiB of
memory, running Linux. We specified Klee parameters to time out after 10
seconds spent in an SMT solver and after 300 seconds of an overall running
time. Increasing these times brings no real effect in our environment. We do not
pass optimize option for Klee because it causes Klee to crash for most of the
input.
Table 1 presents results of our tool on selected functions. The table shows
compilation, instrumentation, slicing, symbolic execution, and the overall run-
ning time. Further, the table presents the ratio of instructions that were sliced
away from the instrumented Llvm code. The last two columns specify the re-
sults of our analysis and the real state confirmed by kernel developers. The table
clearly shows that the bottleneck of our technique is the symbolic execution.
Although the results have no statistical significance, it is clear that the tech-
nique can in principle classify error reports produced by other tools like Stanse.
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File Running Time (s) Sliced
Result
Factual
Function Comp. Instr. Slic. SE Total (%) State
fs/jfs/super.c
jfs quota write
1.25 0.18 0.15 5.09 6.67 67.8 BUG BUG
drivers/net/qlge/qlge main.c
qlge set mac address
2.70 0.72 26.75 13.28 43.45 66.5 BUG BUG
drivers/hid/hidraw.c
hidraw read
1.06 0.18 0.14 Timeout 67.0 TO BUG
drivers/net/ns83820.c
queue refill
1.76 0.29 1.72 0.62 4.39 72.9 FP FP
drivers/usb/misc/
sisusbvga/sisusb con.c
sisusbcon set palette
1.50 0.24 0.27 17.19 19.20 76.0 FP FP
fs/jffs2/nodemgmt.c
jffs2 reserve space
1.04 0.18 0.22 Timeout 46.8 TO FP
kernel/kprobes.c
pre handler kretprobe
0.32 0.09 0.51 2.43 3.35 66.3 ME FP
Table 1. Experimental results. The table presents running time of preprocessing and
compilation (Comp.), instrumentation including points-to analysis (Instr.), slicing
(Slic.), symbolic execution (SE), and the total running time. The column Sliced
presents the ratio of instructions sliced away from the instrumented Llvm code. The
column Result specifies the result of our tool: BUG means that the tool found a real
error, FP means that the analysis finished without error found (i.e. the original error
report is a false positive), TO that the symbolic execution did not finish in time and
ME denotes an occurrence of memory error. The last column specifies the factual state
of the error report.
If our technique reports an error, it is a real one. If it finishes the analysis with-
out any error detected, the original error report is a false positive. The analysis
may also not finish in a given time, which is usually caused by loops in the sliced
code. Finally, it may report a memory error mentioned above.
6 Related Work
A description of program properties in Metal language and meta-level com-
pilation is discussed in [9,10,13,26]. The technique presented in [10] found a
thousands of bugs in real system code. It provides an easy description of prop-
erties to be checked for and a fast analysis. Nevertheless, it suffers from false
positives. Since false positive rate has huge impact on practical usability, an im-
portant part of the technique are false positive suppression algorithms like killing
variables and expressions, synonyms, false path pruning, and others. Besides the
suppression algorithms, bug-reports from the tool are further ranked according
to their probability of being real errors. There are generic and statistical rank-
ing algorithms ordering bug-reports. An extension introduced in [14] provides an
12
automatic inference of some temporal properties based on statistical analysis of
assumed programmer’s beliefs. The ESP [11] technique uses a similar language
to Metal for properties description. It implements an interprocedural dataflow
algorithm based on [32] for error detection and an abstract simulation pruning
algorithm for false positives suppression. Stanse [29], a static analysis tool also
uses state machines for description of checked program properties. The descrip-
tion is based on parametrised abstract syntax trees. Although this tool found
hundreds of real bugs in the Linux kernel, it suffers from a high false positive
rate since its false positive suppression algorithms are very limited.
Program analysis tools based on symbolic execution [27] mainly discover
low-level bugs like division by zero, illegal memory access, assertion failure etc.
These tools typically do not have problems with false positives, but they have
problems with scalability to large programs. There has been developed a lot
of techniques improving the scalability to programs used in practice. Modern
techniques are mostly hybrid. They usually combine symbolic execution with
concrete one [17,18,19,20,34,36]. There are also hybrid techniques combining
symbolic execution with a complementary static analysis [3,22,23,24,28]. Sym-
bolic execution can be accelerated by a compositional approach based on function
summaries [1,15]. Another approach to effective symbolic execution introduced
in [6,7,8] is based on recording of already seen behaviour and pruning its rep-
etition. The followng techniques focus on reaching a specific program location.
Fitnex [39], a search strategy implemented in Pex [36], guides a path exploration
to a particular target location using fitness function. The function measures how
close an already discovered feasible path is to the target. The LESE [33] approach
introduces symbolic variables for the number of times each loop was executed.
The symbolic variables are linked with features of a known grammar generating
inputs. Using these links, the grammar can control the numbers of loop itera-
tions performed on a generated input. A technique presented in [21] analyses
loops on-the-fly, i.e. during simultaneous concrete and symbolic executions of a
program for a concrete input. The loop analysis infers variables that are modi-
fied by a constant value in each loop iteration. These variables are used to build
loop summaries expressed in a form of pre and post conditions. An algorithm
in [35] constructs a nontrivial necessary condition on input values to drive the
program execution to a given location. A technique presented in [30] introduces
a pair of counters for two different paths around loop for each recurrent variable.
Each counter keeps an information about the number of iterations around one
path since the last iteration around the other one. Finally, there is an orthogonal
line of research which tries to improve the symbolic execution for programs with
some special types of inputs. Some techniques deal with programs manipulating
strings [5,40], and some other techniques reduce input space using a given input
grammar [16,33].
The interprocedural static slicing was introduced by Weiser [38]. But nowa-
days, there are many different approaches to program slicing. They are surveyed
by several authors [4,12,37]. Applications of slicing include program debugging,
reverse engineering and regression testing [25].
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7 Future Work
Our future work has basically three independent directions.
First, we plan to run our tool to classify all lock-related error reports pro-
duced by Stanse on the Linux kernel. The results should provide a better image
of practical applicability of the technique. To get a relevant data, we should solve
some practical issues like a correct detection of starting functions, automatic re-
placement of assembler, treatment of external function calls, etc. We should also
implement an on-demand memory allocation to Klee as discussed in Section 5
or use a different executor.
The second direction is to adopt or design some convenient way for speci-
fication of arbitrary state machines. It may be a dedicated language similar to
Metal. Then we plan to implement an instrumentation treating these state ma-
chines. In particular, the instrumentation should correctly handle state machines
associated with dynamically allocated objects.
Finally, we would also like to examine performance of our technique as a
stand-alone error-detection tool. To this point, we have to use a symbolic ex-
ecutor aiming for maximal code coverage. In particular, such an executor has to
suppress execution paths that differ from explored paths only in number of loop
iterations. Unfortunately, we do not know about any publicly available symbolic
executor of this kind. However, it seems that UcKlee [31] (which is not public
as of now) has been designed for a similar purpose.
8 Conclusion
We have presented a novel technique combining three standard methods: speci-
fication of errors with state machines, slicing, and symbolic execution. We cur-
rently do not know about any technique combining arbitrary two of the three
methods. We have discussed a synergy of the three methods. Moreover, our ex-
perimental results indicate that the technique can recognize some false positives
and some real errors in error reports produced by other error-detection tools.
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